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INTRODUCTION 
“Commons” emerge out of and are enacted through sustained patterns of 
local use, through collective actions that give life to and re-assign the roles 
of urban spaces, and through individual investments of time, love, and 
energy.1  Such management practices are voluntary, adaptive, inclusive, 
and available to all.2  Creating commons—or commoning—makes place 
out of space, while asserting the “right to not be excluded” from the use of 
that place.3 
A commons emerges not just within the city, but as the city itself. Cities 
are spaces that are intensely used and invested-in by millions of people, 
transformed from simply locations on a map into places with value through 
collective creative action.  In the words of Sheila Foster and Christian 
Iaione, the city is “a shared resource that belongs to all of its inhabitants.”4  
It draws its “wealth . . . from the collective actions of [those] inhabitants.”5 
Use of shared resources is often the source of tension.  The city is no 
exception6 and a city’s most marginalized residents often have the least 
acknowledged claim to place and urban space.7  The framework of the city 
                                                                                                             
 1. Nicholas Blomley, Enclosure, Common Right and the Property of the Poor, 17 SOC. 
& LEGAL STUD. 311, 320 (2008). 
 2. Id. (citing I. Angus, Substance as a Social Right: A Political Ideal for Socialism?, 65 
STUD. POL. ECON. (2001)). 
 3. Blomley, supra note 1, at 320 (emphasis in original).  See generally C.B. 
MACPHERSON, The Meaning of Property, in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL 
POSITIONS (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1978). 
 4. See Sheila Foster & Christian Iaione, The City as a Commons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 6 (2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2653084 [https://perma.cc/B5WM-DJQ5]. 
 5. Id. at 50. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Integration: 
Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 
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as commons provides a framework to respond to the question “who owns 
the city?”8 at a moment when the additional issues of “who should have the 
benefit of the city?” and “what kind of city it should be?”9 are deeply 
contested. 
There are limits to the urban commons frame.  Yet, as Foster and Iaione 
have discussed, “what the commons can do, both legally and conceptually, 
is to stake out the claim that some socially produced common goods are as 
essential to communities as water and air and thus should be similarly 
protected.”10 
In this Article, we contend that we must recognize and protect the 
commons not simply because the commons resources themselves are 
essential.  First, it is just to ensure that the value that is created through 
commoning is not captured by private market actors to the exclusion and/or 
detriment of the residents who create that value.  Second, being able to see 
what is a common is key to maintaining access to and enhancing the use of 
essential resources.11  And finally, making visible and protecting places 
created through processes of commoning are equitable (re)distributive 







                                                                                                             
1648-57 (1995) (noting that much of the discrimination against Blacks can be attributed to 
the fact that there is a property right in “whiteness” that poor whites maintain and protect 
through the enforcement of residential segregation); Becky Lundberg Witt, Urban 
Agriculture and Local Government Law: Promises, Realities, and Solutions, 16 U. PA. J.L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 221, 221 (2013) (noting that city officials publicly promote urban 
agriculture while creating structures that make it more difficult and expensive for the farms 
to remain permanent). 
 8. Foster & Iaione, supra note 4, at 1 (citing Saskia Sassen, Who Owns Our Cities – 
and Why This Urban Takeover Should Concern Us All, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/nov/24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-
takeover-should-concern-us-all [https://perma.cc/AH5Y-5EKK]). 
 9. Peter Marcuse, From Critical Urban Theory to the Right to the City, 13  CITY 185, 192 
(2009). 
 10. Foster & Iaione, supra note 4, at 28. 
 11. Contrary to assumptions rooted in Garrett Hardin’s work, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, 162 SCI., NEW SERIES 1243, 1248 (Dec. 13, 1968), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1724745, visibility need not lead to over-exposure or over-use, 
but can meaningfully “enhance the value of the resource and the activity taking place within 
it.” See Foster & Iaione, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 
(1986)). 
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-- 
When Mrs. Mabel Wilson12 moved to South Philadelphia’s 2500 block 
of Alter Street in Grays Ferry, in 1928, she did not set out to become an 
urban farmer.  But by the 1930s and 40s, many of Mrs. Wilson’s Alter 
Street neighbors had died or fled the neighborhood, leaving their empty 
homes behind.13  As these empty structures became dangerous to 
surrounding properties, the City of Philadelphia demolished them, one by 
one.  Each left behind an abandoned parcel.14  Thanks to the leadership of 
Mrs. Wilson, neighbors gathered together to transform each of those 
parcels into green and gardened spaces, many of which have survived, if 
tenuously, until this day.  For several generations, these spaces have been 
integral as the neighborhood’s commons.  
-- 
Urban “commoning”15 includes those who create the value of places by 
the use, distribution, and management of increasingly valuable places, from 
the scale of the single parcel to the scale of the city itself.  The land 
stewards in our cities might not call them “commons,” but for places that 
are not formally recognized, commoning offers a more just alternative to 
market allocation and public ownership, as well as a response to the private 
and public owners who originally divested from these spaces.16 
Today, Philadelphians speak of 40,000 parcels like the abandoned ones 
on Alter Street.  They are distributed throughout the city and concentrated 
in areas associated with historic disinvestment—low-income 
neighborhoods and neighborhoods home to predominantly Black, Puerto 
Rican, and immigrant communities.17  To municipal officials and 
                                                                                                             
 12. See e.g., Joseph Myers, Taxing Times at Central Club, S. PHILLY REV. (June 7, 
2012), http://www.southphillyreview.com/2012/jun/7/Taxing-times-at-Central-Club-
157601275/ [https://perma.cc/CD6F-7APL]. 
 13. Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution of The Sheriff’s Sale of Real Property Or, In 
The Alternative, To Postpone Sheriff’s Sale, U.S. Bank v. David May, (May 1, 2012), 
http://www.pilcop.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/petition-mays2540_2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TU9T-TKBD]. 
 14. Id.   
 15. Peter Linebaugh, Some Principles of the Commons, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/01/08/some-principles-of-the-commons 
[https://perma.cc/5UR5-73BE]. 
 16. Nate Ela, Urban Commons as Property Experiment: Mapping Chicago’s Farms and 
Gardens, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 247 (2016). 
 17. Karen Black, Philadelphia Achieves Land Bank Through Compromise, 
SHELTERFORCE (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.shelterforce.org/article/3575/philadelphia_achieves_land_bank_through_compr
omise [https://perma.cc/H8FC-4WJK].  See generally Patrick Kerkstra, PLANPHILLY, 
Special Report: The Delinquency Crisis (Aug. 13, 2011), 
http://planphilly.com/articles/2011/08/13/special-report-delinquency-crisis 
[https://perma.cc/QX7T-9JVG]. 
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developers, these parcels became unproductive land resources once the 
owners of record faded from view.18  Abandoned parcels are called 
“vacant,”19 but, in fact, so many are not actually empty. 
Community-stewarded spaces, like community gardens, farms, and 
parks, have historically emerged as a direct response to abandonment, 
filling vacancy with neighborhood life.  Located in historically 
marginalized neighborhoods, governed and managed without the benefit of 
external resources, and functioning without clear pathways to ensure legal 
tenure, land stewards often must operate tenuously on the edge of trespass 
and outside of traditional notions of private property ownership.20 
The “commons” is best understood as a set of collective interests that 
support collective rights.21  Commons are less about the use of the 
resource,22 more about the right to the resource.23  Yet, a community’s 
rights to commons in the form of these places24 are often not honored by 
outside forces.  Further, a community’s lack of clear rights is linked to and 
reinforced by the persistent lack of visibility for the common rights that 
emerge through use.  Municipal governments often do not “see” these 
spaces or their creators, even as government holds legal title to the land or 
manages the property registration system that allows another absent entity 
or individual to hold title. 
Invisibility heightens the risk that community-stewarded spaces will be 
sold and the community ejected while outside actors capture and profit 
from the value created through the loving labor of residents.  As urban 
space is transformed into a commodity, whether it be through sale of a 
parcel or the value accrued by surrounding properties, these community 
                                                                                                             
 18. Community Life Improvement Programs: Vacant Lot Program, CITY OF PHILA. (Jan. 
21, 2016), http://www.phila.gov/qualityoflife/vacantlotprogram/Pages/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/3Q4R-84HA]. 
 19. Alex Zimmerman, Property Control: Neighborhood Groups Wary of Land-Bank 
Bill, PITT. CITY PAPER (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/property-
control-neighborhood-groups-wary-of-land-bank-bill/Content?oid=1727488 
[https://perma.cc/6R23-GFPP]. 
 20. See e.g., Jessica Owley & Tonya Lewis, From Vacant Lots to Full Pantries: Urban 
Agriculture Programs and the American City, 91 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 233, 237 (2014). 
 21. Blomley, supra note 1, at 320. 
 22. Garrett Hardin’s pasture is not the most strategic or accurate depiction of the 
“commons.” See generally, Hardin, supra note 11. 
 23. See generally DAVID HARVEY, The Creation of the Urban Commons, in REBEL 
CITIES: FROM THE RIGHT TO THE CITY TO THE URBAN REVOLUTION 67, 73 (Verso ed. 2012); 
Blomley, supra note 1; Marcuse, supra note 9.  
 24. As opposed to ones held in explicit community structures such as community land 
trusts or designations of preserved open space or parkland. 
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spaces become the places where “enclosure”—land insecurity brought on 
by a market interest—is felt most directly.25 
In this Article, we describe the mechanisms through which the 
community-generated wealth accumulated in our neighborhoods via 
community-stewarded open spaces is enclosed: captured by the market and 
made inaccessible to land stewards.  And we present some legal and 
community organizing strategies to resist this enclosure.  In Part I, we 
discuss community-managed open spaces in American cities in the context 
of the racialized history of twentieth-century urban space.  In Part II, we 
explore the dimensions of invisibility that put these spaces at risk of 
transformation into market commodities.  In Part III, we describe 
interventions that allow the creators of common wealth to resist its 
enclosure.  And in Conclusion, we draw from those interventions a set of 
guidelines with which to move forward with accountability and in service 
of social justice.  
I.  COMMUNITY LAND STEWARDS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY NORTH 
AMERICAN CITY  
A. Why Garden? 
The existence of [vacant] areas constitutes a serious and growing menace, 
is injurious to the public safety, health, morals and welfare, contributes 
increasingly to the spread of crime, juvenile delinquency and disease, 
necessitates excessive and disproportionate expenditures of public funds 
for all forms of public service and constitutes a negative influence on 
                                                                                                             
 25. The historical enclosure of the commons that serves as a departure for much of 
commons scholarship is a physical place: a pasture in the center of English towns and 
woodlands at their periphery that landless peasants relied upon as crucial places to grow 
food for their families, collect firewood, and graze any livestock they owned for meat and 
milk.  The enclosure of that commons was done quite literally: by evicting the peasants and 
fencing the land to divide it and facilitate treating formerly commonly-accessible sites as 
private property. See Linebaugh, supra note 15.  This enclosure is iconic in the commons 
literature chiefly because of resistance to it by an ideologically-motivated group of landless 
peasants calling themselves “The Diggers,” who refused to respect eviction orders and 
defiantly cultivated the formerly common lands, until they too, were driven out.  Luckily for 
generations of scholars, they narrated their own struggle and published a pamphlet. See 
generally A Declaration From the Poor Oppressed People of England (1649), 
http://www.bilderberg.org/land/poor.htm [https://perma.cc/KW92-EGBV].  In the context of 
the city as commons, enclosure is any privatization of resources that have been or should be 
publicly accessible.  When applied to land-based resources (community parks, gardens, 
farms), this privatization is enclosure both literally (fences, eviction) and by analogy (the 
capture of publicly-created value by private actors who can then trade it as a commodity). 
See e.g., Foster & Iaione supra note 4, at 23-24 (discussing the “capture [of] the ‘unearned 
increment’”). 
2016] YOU CAN’T COMMON WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE 201 
adjacent properties impairing their economic soundness and stability, 
thereby threatening the source of public revenues.26 
Gardens and other community-managed spaces are products of a 
racialized history of urban space.  Concentrations of abandonment and 
properties left in legal limbo burden already burdened places.  What we 
refer to now as “vacant land” is the legacy of racial segregation,27 
redlining,28 and urban renewal,29 and more recently exacerbated by 
predatory lending,30 the ensuing mortgage foreclosure crisis, and new 
discriminatory practices in access to credit.31  For decades, municipal and 
private landowners have left acres of land in neighborhoods like Grays 
Ferry abandoned in cities across the Rust Belt and in the Northeast. 
The massive abandonment of individual properties in the mid-twentieth 
century was not coincidental, but part of a multi-faceted national housing 
policy that incentivized suburban and ‘greenfield’ housing development 
and purposely dis-incentivized investment in urban spaces, further 
disenfranchising people of color and immigrants.  And this has historically 
been by design—the discriminatory policies and practice of investing in 
places that feel safe for white people to live relies on a clear separation 
from neighborhoods where people who are perceived as other than white 
                                                                                                             
 26. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 501.   
 27. See, e.g., Amy E. Hillier, Redlining and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, 29 J. 
URB. HIST. 394, 395 (2003). 
 28. Id. 
 29. “In 1949, Congress initiated the federal urban redevelopment program, or ‘urban 
renewal,’ with the passage of Title I of the Housing Policy Act of 1949, which provided 
resources to the municipal project of ‘blight clearance.’  Title I allocated federal funds so 
that local redevelopment authorities could buy and clear so-called blighted areas and then 
sell that land to private developers, using the proceeds to cover public costs.” Amy Laura 
Cahn, On Retiring Blight as Policy and Making Eastwick Whole, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 450, 456 (2014); see also Jane E. Schukoske, Community Development Through 
Gardening: State and Local Policies Transforming Urban Open Space, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 351, 354 (2000) (citing Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 67 
(1995) (discussing the “high cost” of “slum clearance policy” on “existing social capital”)). 
 30. David D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. 21, 24 (citing Vicki 
Been, Ingrid Ellen & Josiah Madar, The High Cost of Segregation: Exploring Racial 
Disparities in High Cost Lending, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361 (2009)). 
 31. Anna Clark, The Threat to Detroit’s Rebound Isn’t Crime or the Economy, It’s the 
Mortgage Industry, NEXT CITY (Dec. 7, 2015), https://nextcity.org/features/view/detroit-
bankruptcy-revival-crime-economy-mortgage-loans-redlining [https://perma.cc/B34V-J947] 
(“In all but a handful of Detroit neighborhoods, you better have cash on hand for both the 
purchase price and the tens of thousands of dollars of rehab work.  Loans here are nearly 
impossible to find.”). 
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live.32 As a result, voids emerge where concentrated poverty and a lack of 
critical resources come together in urban centers.33   
One of the starkest examples of disinvestment is known as redlining.  In 
urban centers nationwide, a Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) 
ratings were just one manifestation of the massive systemic barriers created 
to prevent Black families from obtaining access to credit and fire 
insurance.34  Mortgage and insurance companies denied residents the 
resources needed to purchase and protect homes.35  Lines on the HOLC 
maps explicitly congealed value in certain areas, areas inaccessible to 
certain residents based on their race.  The dividing lines had direct impact 
on whether Black—as well as, immigrant—families have had access to 
acquire and maintain wealth via property ownership.36  And often, as a 
direct result, they did not. 
To make matters worse, lack of individual financial resources created 
further barriers to “active ownership,” when family members could not 
afford to probate an estate or take other necessary steps to transfer and/or 
maintain clear title.  But that lack of capital was, again, just a symptom of a 
system built to obstruct Black families building wealth.37 
Redlining was only one in a host of factors that spurred disinvestment, 
population loss, vacancy, and a systematic denial of wealth building to 
nonwhite families concentrated in particular geographic areas.38  The same 
neighborhoods that were denied access to credit via HOLC policies were 
later declared “blighted”39 and subjected to slum clearance.40  And just a 
                                                                                                             
 32. Camille Z. Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 ANN. REV. 
SOCIOLOGY 167, 198 (2003). 
 33. See e.g., id. at 168; John A. Powell, Whiteness and Spatial Racism: Dreaming of a 
Self Beyond Whiteness and Isolation, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 45 (2005), 
http://racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=397:whoteness15aa&ca
tid=69&Itemid=165 [https://perma.cc/S2KT-AQBQ]. 
 34. See Hillier, supra note 27, at 420. 
 35. Anne Whiston Spirn, Restoring Mill Creek: Landscape Literacy, Environmental 
Justice and City Planning and Design, 30 LANDSCAPE RES. 395, 399 (July 2005). 
 36. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, THE ATLANTIC (May 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ 
[https://perma.cc/4KGF-C5MZ]. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Foster & Iaione, supra note 4, at 19 (citing Georgette C. Phillips, Zombie Cities: 
Urban Form and Population Loss, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 703 (2014)). 
 39. See supra note 29. See also Wendell Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: 
Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 2 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14 
(2003); cf. Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and 
the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 310–11 (2004). 
 40. For New York City, compare maps of HOLC lines with urban renewal areas at 
urbanreviewer.org [https://perma.cc/QZ9G-XKC4]. 
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few decades later, those same neighborhoods became the direct target of 
the sub-prime lending market.41 
These phenomena perpetuate ongoing inequity.  These are the 
neighborhoods where foreclosures are now concentrated,42 where vast 
numbers of people pay more than 50% of their income in rent,43 and where 
renters most often find themselves in housing court.44  These are the 
neighborhoods where effects of mass imprisonment are felt 
disproportionately;45 the neighborhoods to and from which you might have 
to take a bus because the subway does not reach there;46 the neighborhoods 
where few hospitals ever opened and where those that did are closing;47 the 
neighborhoods with few grocery stores;48 and the places overburdened with 
                                                                                                             
 41. Compare id., with Deyanira Del Rio, Mortgage Lending and Foreclosures in 
Immigrant Communities: Expanding Fair Housing and Fair Lending Opportunity Among 
Low Income and Undocumented Immigrants, KIRWAN INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF RACE 
AND ETHNICITY OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY (2010), 
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2010/02_2010_ForeclosuresandImmigrantCom
m_DelRio.pdf [https://perma.cc/MF6A-NF7U]. 
 42. See, e.g., Matthew Bloch & Janet Roberts, Mapping Foreclosures in the New York 
Region, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/05/15/nyregion/0515-foreclose.html. 
 43. See e.g., CMTY. SERV. SOC’Y & UNITED WAY OF N.Y.C., Renters in Most Low-
Income Neighborhoods Face Very High Rent Burdens, in MAPPING POVERTY IN NEW YORK 
CITY: PINPOINTING THE IMPACT OF POVERTY, COMMUNITY BY COMMUNITY 7 (2005), 
http://www.cssny.org/userimages/downloads/Mapping_booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Z74-
QBU8]. 
 44. See id. at 9; NATIONAL VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE 
TRUE COSTS TO COMMUNITIES (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/true-costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ACC-
Z274]. 
 45. As an example, the neighborhood of Brownsville, in Brooklyn’s 16th Community 
District, is home to Brooklyn’s highest proportion of residents living below the federal 
poverty line.  The residents who live in District 16 are nearly all people of color.  During 
2003, one in twenty adult men in the district was admitted to jail or prison (not counting 
those living in the District who are on parole, probation, or other community supervision).  
Even more troubling, one in twelve young men between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four 
go to either prison or jail from this District every year. See Justice Atlas of Sentencing and 
Corrections, NEW YORK, JUSTICE MAPPING CENTER, http://www.justiceatlas.org/. 
 46. See ONNYTURF, NYC Subway Map, http://www.onnyturf.com/subway/.  This is a 
subway map overlaid on a Google map showing the gaps in service that the MTA map’s 
distortion hides. See also AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY, MEAN TRAVEL TIME TO WORK OF 
WORKERS 16 YEARS AND OVER WHO DID NOT WORK AT HOME (2008), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_
5YR_GCT0801.US01PR&prodType=table [https://perma.cc/PV6Z-4ZUL?type=image]. 
 47. See Dennis Osorioi & Angeline Thomas, The Health Equity Challenge: People of 




 48. See e.g., Unshared Bounty: How Structural Racism Contributes to the Creation and 
Persistence of Food Deserts, ACLU RACIAL JUST. PROGRAM (June 2012), 
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the industry and trash incinerators that destroy a community’s health, but 
without the parks that enhance it.49  These are also the neighborhoods 
where the majority of the nation’s poor people and people of color live50 
and where life expectancy might be twenty years shorter than more affluent 
neighborhoods.51  And they are the neighborhoods where current forces 
continue to disinvest in current manifestations of redlining52 and predatory 
lending and where gentrification and displacement are vigorously knocking 
at the gates.53 
The same communities that shouldered the burdens of generations of 
market abandonment and municipal neglect are now at-risk of wholesale 
displacement due to renewed interest in urban space as real estate. 
In the face of such forces: why garden?  
People living in marginalized communities build gardens, parks, and 
farms as just one strategy to invest in the infrastructure and social 
structures of their neighborhoods when faced with huge resource gaps.  A 
Furman Center comparison of New York City census tracts bears out this 
                                                                                                             
http://www.racialjusticeproject.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2012/06/NYLS-Food-
Deserts-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SPK9-PQZ9]. 
 49. See generally Parks, Playgrounds & Open Space Layers of OASIS Interactive Map 
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fact: census tracts with gardens were poorer than those in neighboring 
tracts that do not have them (poverty rate of 36.7% versus 18.8%), have a 
lower homeownership rate (12.7% versus 31.5%), a higher unemployment 
rate (13.2% versus 8.1%), and are disproportionately home to Black and 
Hispanic residents (81.6% versus 43.9%).54  The Furman authors call these 
neighborhoods “distressed,”55 one of many terms imposed on 
neighborhoods to which resources have been denied.  But that term, like 
“blight,” masks the origins of that distress and dismisses the community 
actions to address it. 
Since at least World War II, residents of these neighborhoods left behind 
have filled the voids by creating gardens, parks, and farms.56  Individuals 
and groups of people physically stepping in and taking over these left-
behind “surplus” places is a demonstration of resistance and a positive 
corollary to historic injustice.57 
B. Are Community Gardens “Commons”? 
Over time, community gardeners and other stewards have changed the 
nature of the real property they use, creating a common resource from 
property to which the city or another entity holds title.58  Neighbors labor to 
create places of meaning out of neglected land.  A community garden is not 
simply a place where residents cultivate food—it is an embodiment of an 
expression of residents’ rights to their city.59  Our cities’ gardens, farms, 
and community parks reveal the often-collective transformative efforts 
undertaken by residents for reasons beyond personal (or family) financial 
gain.  The management strategies that people use within them might be 
common pool resource strategies60 or that of a typical hierarchical non-
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profit enterprise, or they might be operated by a solitary gardener to benefit 
the community as a whole.61 All of these spaces represent a coming 
together by community residents to create food, build ties, and share 
resources, often pulling from historic farming traditions.62  Each rests 
on some form of mutual aid,63 self-determination,64 and self-
government.65 
As to the question of governance, Nate Ela writes that “[i]nstead of 
relying on local government to bring about the commons by ordinance, 
urban farmers and gardeners are said to be ‘self-organizing’ the rules of the 
urban commons.”66  He suggests that garden governance structures “are not 
what we usually associate with the commons.”67  The internal structure is 
not the point, nor is it even whether the gardeners have named these spaces 
as “commons.”  As Ela notes, gardeners and “their allies in and out of city 
government are keen to devise ways for people to access and use land as a 
shared, productive resource.”68 
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The point is that people who live in neighborhoods have responded to 
the forces pulling resources from their communities by improving the value 
and welfare of their communities and determining the future of their 
neighborhood.  Using this accepted definition, the transformed parcels on 
Alter Street in Philadelphia have been, for several generations, 
manifestations of “the commons.” 
C. Visiting the Greens 
1. Philadelphia, 1937-2005 
Philadelphia community gardening has deep roots, which begin with the 
Vacant Lot Cultivation Association (VLCA), founded in 1897.  The VLCA 
assisted Philadelphia residents in accessing vacant parcels for children’s 
gardens and entrepreneurial market gardens.69  Of Philadelphia’s current 
active gardens, few reach back as far as the ones started by Mrs. Mabel 
Wilson and the Central Club for Boys and Girls on Alter Street,70 but many 
date back thirty years or more, as residents partnered with the Pennsylvania 
Horticultural Society and Penn State Extension to respond to the impacts of 
“[d]eindustrialization and population loss” of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.71  
Gardeners reclaimed abandoned parcels citywide, as the Alter Street 
neighbors had done, and like Mrs. Wilson and her neighbors on Alter 
Street, most of Philadelphia’s gardeners were Black, Puerto Rican, and 
South Asian, migrating to the city with farming traditions that helped them 
cultivate spaces for growing culturally appropriate food and preserve 
culture.72  
The 2500 block of Alter Street is just at the northeast edge of the Grays 
Ferry neighborhood, cut off from the adjacent Point Breeze neighborhood 
by train tracks to the east and nestled in the middle of industrial uses that 
have waned over time.73  It is difficult, several lifetimes later, to point to 
why the specific owners of eighteen out of twenty-six parcels on one South 
Philadelphia block abandoned their properties.  What is known is that, as 
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far back as 1937 and less than a decade following Mrs. Wilson’s arrival, a 
HOLC surveyor flagged the neighborhood as containing “detrimental 
influences” of “Negro encroachment” and “heavy obsolescence” and 
labeled it as Security Grade “D.”74  In other words, the neighborhood was 
redlined.75  Unlike the majority-Black Point Breeze, Grays Ferry has long 
been an interracial neighborhood, but one beset by racial tensions coming 
out of ongoing integration of the neighborhood and exploding several times 
over many decades,76 including a week-long race riot when a black female 
probation officer moved into the neighborhood in 1918.77 
Mrs. Wilson may well have been taking a personal risk when she moved 
to Alter Street in 1928, but she immediately took leadership.  By 1929, she 
had purchased the uninhabited building across the street from her home 
with the entirety of her savings – five hundred dollars – to create the 
Central Club for Boys and Girls.78  She did not stop there. The voids left by 
neighbors, swept from the neighborhood by systemic conditions and life 
circumstances, were filled, under Mrs. Wilson’s unwavering leadership, by 
those who stayed and created what they needed to survive and thrive.79 
Multiple generations of Alter Street residents cared for at least a dozen 
parcels on one small block. 
For over seventy years, Central Club members functioned as the 
adoptive stewards of Alter Street’s left-behind lots.  The Central Club lots 
were home to decades of 4-H groups, Boy and Girl Scout troops, and 
vacation bible school,80 sometimes supported with public funding.81  
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Members created garden plots, provided food baskets for area families, and 
hosted sixty-nine years of annual Central Club events, alumni gatherings, 
family reunions, and repasts.82  The club itself had legal status; it had 
incorporated in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as a nonprofit 
corporation in 1947.83  However, the corporation had no visible legal 
connection to the land, placing residents in constant risk of losing access to 
this common resource via a market-driven enclosure. 
2. New York, 1974-1998 
Local rumor is that United States Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm 
grew up in the house that used to stand at 89 Schenectady Avenue, 
Brooklyn.84  A Weeksville historian points to the concrete steps that have 
since been re-purposed as a recirculating pool full of fish and says: “Those 
were the steps into her house.”85  In 1982, the house, and the whole 
neighborhood, was in pretty bad shape.  The city ordered the building 
demolished.86  
 Once the site of the first independent Black community in New York, 
Weeksville was squarely within the red lines of the HOLC maps; no access 
to credit meant that properties deteriorated.87  While many people left, 
many also stayed, deepening their roots in the neighborhood. 
Our Lady of Charity, a national model for Black Catholic education and 
community outreach,88 became a rallying place and a haven in a segregated 
city.  Delores Olff, a parishioner, told the New York Times in 1989 that, 
before joining Our Lady of Charity, she belonged to an integrated church, 
also in Brooklyn, that had a white priest.89  Olff once said, “[y]ou know, the 
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priest refused to come to my house because he said it was in a bad 
neighborhood.”90 
Mrs. Olff and fellow parishioners worked hard to improve the 
neighborhood.  Without help from outside institutions, they relied on each 
other and their networks.91  The group formed a Housing Committee, 
starting with the abandoned properties right around the church.92  In 1981, 
the Committee set its sights on the neighboring dilapidated house with a 
yard facing the church’s sidewall and succeeded in getting two Florida 
residents, who shared title, to transfer the deed to a member of the 
committee.93  That’s where the fish are now. 94 
The group formed an independent not-for-profit organization called 
Imani Community Housing and Revitalization Committee, Inc., took title 
to the properties, demolished the crumbling eyesores, and started their 
garden.95  According to Jean Griffith-Sandiford,96 an active gardener from 
1983 to 1990, the lot was full of kale by the time she started gardening.97  
Gardeners from the church grew plants that reflected the traditions of their 
southern origins and shared the harvest.98 
The not-for-profit organization relied on the Church for administration.99  
Although clearly using the land for a public benefit purpose that would 
have been sufficient to meet the standard for property tax abatement in 
New York City,100 they never applied for it.  The Church simply paid the 
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tax bill when it arrived every year.101  The garden thrived,102 expanding to a 
third City-owned lot between the Church and the donated properties.  They 
called it Imani.103 
II.  THE INVISIBILITY OF COMMUNITY-STEWARDED SPACE 
Community-managed open spaces in urban places often began with the 
abandonment of those same places—the complete removal of attention, 
resources, and responsibility over a space by the legal owner and municipal 
government alike that leads to “distress.”  These are the conditions that 
engender community-led grassroots transformations.  They are also the 
conditions that often lead to the invisibility and the vulnerability of these 
essential community spaces.  The very bedrock institutions into which 
residents have poured life and from which the neighborhood draws 
sustenance become the most fragile. They are simply “real estate” when 
urban space is transformed from city-as-commons into city-as-commodity. 
The forces that threaten community gardens and open spaces within the 
context of city-as-commodity reflect the situation of small-scale and 
community-based food producers worldwide.104  As Smita Narula 
examined with respect to agricultural land rights in the global context, a 
market-driven approach systemically ignores the rights—and leads to the 
eviction of—marginalized communities with historic connections to 
land.105  When land is seen purely as a commodity, a framework that uses 
the market to formalize rights provides no mechanism to account for 
existing scenarios reflective of “communal visions of land ownership.”106  
A market-driven approach attempts to maximize productivity on land 
viewed as “‘empty’ or ‘unoccupied’”—land which might be subject to 
“long-standing rights of use, access and management based on custom.”107  
The result, for agricultural land globally as for urban community gardens, 
is the transformation of “a collective interest into an individualized one”108 
and the displacement, appropriation, and enclosure of a community 
resource. 
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That threat of enclosure persists as one of the “greatest barriers to the 
implementation and sustainability” of community gardens.109  Gardeners 
have long understood “land tenure [to be] both a challenge and a vital 
element to the future success of the movement.”110  In 2008, Domenic 
Vitiello and Michael Nairn identified land policy and associated lack of 
land security as one of the major causes of the disappearance of almost half 
of Philadelphia’s gardens over a twelve-year period.111 
Land insecurity manifests in a host of ways, many of which are rooted in 
invisibility to the city-as-commodity. When gardens emerge from 
abandoned spaces, they are often tied up in a quagmire of privately owned 
tax delinquent land, but are not party to—not seen as part of—the 
transactions surrounding concerning that land, which can include property 
tax and mortgage foreclosure sales, tax lien securitization, speculative real 
estate transactions, and even title fraud. Many gardens often lack capital 
and thus do not always have the resources necessary to achieve 
preservation. 
As a result of lacking financial capital, gardeners are, often viewed as 
lacking political capital and, thus, ignored in decision-making about one 
garden or in policy-making that affects the future of many gardens and 
open spaces.  Policies regarding access to public land treat gardens as an 
“interim use” for a parcel that is awaiting a “higher and better” use,112 
while municipal government agencies often label garden parcels as 
“vacant” land, despite years of community activity.113  When the city is 
commodity, vacant land as a whole is consistently perceived as a scarce 
resource even when cities struggle to put specific inactive spaces into 
productive reuse. 
In this context, gardens are allowed to stay put until some other entity 
desires to purchase the land.  Only then do community-stewarded spaces 
lose out in a contest against “revenue-generating” uses, without being seen 
as valuable to the health and sustainability of a neighborhood in a more 
holistic sense. 
Residents who create gardens do so disproportionately in historically 
marginalized communities—low-income neighborhoods, neighborhoods 
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where Black and brown people live, and immigrant neighborhoods.114  
Decisions about these so-called distressed neighborhoods are likely made at 
a distance from and without the participation of residents, while the work 
of residents themselves is undervalued. 
And, practically speaking, most land insecure gardens are contending 
with not just one, but multiple concurrent land tenure challenges, rooted in 
overlapping invisibilities. 
A. Tax Place: Debt Is More Valuable Than a Garden 
Property tax delinquency is both a cause and effect of abandonment and 
disinvestment.  Abandoned property can sit for generations without the 
party named on the deed participating in maintenance or paying real estate 
taxes.  And in Philadelphia, it is the “landlords, speculators and investors 
who do not live at the delinquent properties they own” who most often fail 
to pay.115  The mechanisms to collect property tax debt have long been 
broken.116  Nothing might happen for years until, at some arbitrary point, 
some entity decides there is value to capture in the property and moves 
forward with collection efforts that end in foreclosure and transfer of title. 
1. Philadelphia, 2005-2015 
Although its on-the-ground presence on Alter Street was unmistakable, 
Central Club could not build wealth by accruing equity in the property over 
time or create the stability that comes from community ownership of 
property;117 deeds remained for decades in the names of owners who had 
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last acquired the property in 1911 or soon after.118  Tax debt bills and 
municipal liens addressed to absent owners mounted.119 
The debt on property itself is a commodity for trade.  Many 
municipalities, including Philadelphia and New York City, have a history 
of securitizing that debt such that it is sold to private entities.120  Investors 
buy the debt assured that they will make money on interest and fees and 
speculating on the value of the property itself should collection fail.  
Community land stewards are often unaware when debt against the 
properties they care for is bundled and sold because they do not receive 
notice.  Even where they do receive notice, stewards do not have access to 
sufficient counsel to understand that the accrued tax debt and subsequent 
sale can lead to the loss of the property.121  Many believe that property 
taxes do not apply because they are incorporated as not-for-profit entities. 
Invisible debt mounts and transforms into a lien against the property that 
can be sold.122  A private purchaser of municipal debt adds interest, costs, 
and attorneys’ fees and can pursue tax foreclosure actions.123  The impact 
of these actions on existing users – often gardeners – is irrelevant to the 
buyer and seller of the debt. 
On the 2500 block of Alter Street, it took the City of Philadelphia more 
than thirty years of recorded property tax debt before the Department of 
Revenue initiated foreclosure proceedings—selecting two non-adjacent 
properties out of the many Central Club had stewarded for years.124  In 
2005, foreclosure proceedings resulted in those properties being sold at 
auction and Central Club lacked any legal status to protect its interest in the 
                                                                                                             
http://www.bqlt.org/ [https://perma.cc/EBA9-SVEX]; NEIGHBORHOOD GARDENS TR., 
http://ngtrust.org/ [https://perma.cc/4BVF-APFY]. 
 118. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 12; Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 
13. 
 119. Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13. 
 120. See, e.g., Ben Hayllar, Philadelphia’s Tax Lien Sale and Securitization, THE FREE 
LIBRARY (Aug. 2013), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Philadelphia’s tax lien sale and 
securitization.-a020219252 [https://perma.cc/HU2X-BH59]; John Krinsky, Managing New 
York City’s Rental Housing Catastrophe: The Once and Future Potential of Tax-Foreclosed 
Properties, METROPOLITICS (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Managing-New-
York-City-s-Rental.html [https://perma.cc/CVC6-ZQN2]. 
 121. See, e.g., Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13. 
 122. See, e.g., Alan S. Osher, Perspectives; New York City Shifts Tactics on Troubled 
Housing N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/16/realestate/perspectives-new-york-city-shifts-tactics-on-
troubled-housing.html. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment Search Engine, 
https://alpha.phila.gov/property/?bn=2500&bs=Alter%20Street/ [https://perma.cc/A4VS-
QLSG] (showing “valuation, tax, and physical details of properties within the City of 
Philadelphia”).  Philadelphia property tax records only go back to 1978. 
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gardens125 Despite years of stewardship, Central Club lost the properties to 
speculative real estate interests that, to this day, have done nothing with the 
land.126 
With Central Club’s legacy at risk, its board filed a series of quiet title 
actions asserting ownership of the remaining “vacant” parcels based on 
adverse possession or squatters’ rights.127  Central Club prevailed in 2010, 
establishing equitable title to eight parcels, relying on the court’s authority 
to declare Central Club’s equitable ownership under the doctrine of adverse 
possession.128  However, without the resources to pay the transfer taxes to 
put the deeds in its name and immediately burdened by the tax debt of long 
absent owners, Central Club was still legally invisible. The risk of being 
displaced from the land Mrs. Wilson and her successors nurtured 
continued.129 
Central Club was legally invisible to the formal property registration 
system; at the same time, Central Club could not see debt owed on the 
properties prior to 1996. That debt had been sold to a private bank as 
securitized tax liens; even a search of the City of Philadelphia’s online tax 
records would not have reflected pre-1997 debt.130  With Central Club 
                                                                                                             
 125. See Myers, supra note 12; see also Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra 
note 13, at 68. 
 126. Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13, at 68. 
 127. Myers, supra note 12; see also Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 
13, at 44. 
 128. See Ashley Hahn, Community Farm in South Kensington Claiming Its Ground in 
Court, PLANPHILLY (Mar. 23, 2016), http://planphilly.com/articles/2016/03/23/community-
farm-in-south-kensington-claiming-its-ground-in-court [https://perma.cc/W5MG-7Q42].  
Under Pennsylvania law, adverse possession permits acquiring formal ownership of 
property through showing the current occupant had actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, 
notorious, distinct, and hostile possession of the land for 21 years. Baylor v. Soska, 540 Pa. 
435, 438 (1995) (citing Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. v. Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592 (1949)). 
 129. See Myers, supra note 12. 
 130. Ben Hayllar, Philadelphia’s Tax Lien Sale and Securitization, THE FREE LIBRARY 
(Dec. 1, 1997), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Philadelphia’s tax lien sale and 
securitization.-a020219252 [https://perma.cc/B4LS-6XX3].  In 1997, Philadelphia Mayor 
Ed Rendell “bundled 33,000 tax liens and, through a bond issued by the Philadelphia 
Industrial Development Corporation, collected $106 million” to fund the underfinanced 
school district and encourage economic developments. Holly Otterbein, 3 Arguments for, 
and 3 Against, Darrell Clarke’s Alternate School Funding Plan, PHILA. MAG. (Jan. 15, 
2016), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2015/04/14/darrell-clarke-school-funding-tax-
deadbeats [https://perma.cc/8QQY-FXSD].  But years later, the city was forced to default on 
$46 million in bonds when investors had trouble collecting the overdue taxes and finding the 
lots’ owners.  Overall, the sale was regarded as a disaster for the city as it both failed to 
provide the touted economic benefits and exacerbated abandonment.  The properties 
selected for the lien sale were those with the most uncollectable debt.  These properties 
“remained in limbo for years and unavailable for redevelopment.  Public agencies could not 
acquire the property without first paying the lien holder the value of the lien, plus their fees, 
which stymied efforts to get vacant, tax delinquent properties back into productive use.” 
Letter from Rose Gray, Asociación Puertorriqueños en Marcha et al. to Mayor Michael 
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acknowledging its title and seeking legal control of the land, the pre-1996 
tax debt unknowingly became ripe for collection.  In 2011, a private bank, 
filed foreclosure actions against the deceased recorded owners of three of 
the eight Central Club parcels.131  Because Central Club had not, yet, paid 
the tax to transferred title into its name, the tax collector itself did not see 
Central Club as the owner and did not provide notice of the sale to the 
Club. They didn’t even bother to put up a sign.  The Club scrambled to 
have a voice in the proceedings.132 
Central Club found the negative effects of abandonment compounded by 
policies used to “solve” such problems—property tax foreclosure and 
privatization of tax debt.133  External solutions to the problem of 
disinvestment failed to account for the existence of the land’s stewards, 
ultimately penalizing the very community members that invested when no 
one else would. 
2. “Interim Use” Never “Highest and Best” 
Gardens on publicly owned property might be more visible when a 
municipality is the legal owner of record, as opposed to private entities like 
in the case of Central Club.  Cities often rely on gardens for vacant land 
management.  Gardens might be tacitly accepted, despite a lack of formal 
legal permission, or might be granted temporary permission via a “garden 
license.”  Unlike a lease, which provides a property right, a standard license 
is revocable at any time without cause.134  Thus, a license offers no land 
security, only temporary permission that comes with the assurance that one 
is no longer trespassing.  These agreements reflect the perception within 
many city governments, in Philadelphia, New York, and elsewhere, that 
urban agriculture is an “interim use.”135 
Community-stewarded spaces can exist as licensed or ignored places 
until another entity expresses interest in purchasing the land from the 
municipality.  The garden’s value absorbs into the market value of the 
                                                                                                             
Nutter, City of Phila. (June 11, 2015) [https://perma.cc/8E8V-GE9E].  Overall, “[t]he bulk 
sale of tax liens creates a category of properties (“Limbo Properties”) which remain tax 
delinquent, increase destabilization, and are beyond control of the City.” Id. at 3. 
 131. Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13, at 5. 
 132. Myers, supra note 12.  Central Club worked with newly-formed Garden Justice 
Legal Initiative (GJLI) at the Public Interest Law Center, which had launched one month 
before. 
 133. See Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13 at 53-54.  
 134. Witt, supra note 7, at 227; see, e.g., Office of the State Comptroller, State of New 
York, (Dec. 22, 1988) (distinguishing between the temporary privilege of a “revocable 
license” and the greater rights associated with a lease). 
 135. WACHTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 34.  
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property, but the garden stewards are not a party to the transaction.  Their 
labor disappears under the cover of the City’s formal deed ownership. 
Even when seen, community-stewarded spaces—and their creators—are 
often perceived as merely steppingstones to a “higher and better” use,136 i.e. 
a use that results in the highest value for transactions that involve the 
market transfer of the land.137  A 2010 study created for the Philadelphia 
Redevelopment Authority (PRA) makes this clear.  It advised, “[i]t is 
appropriate for the [PRA] to pursue temporary urban agriculture 
arrangements on its low-value parcels, regardless of whether it represents 
the final highest and best use of those parcels, when agricultural uses 
increase the value of those parcels and of neighboring parcels.”138 
In short, the PRA was advised to view gardening as “a means to other 
ends”139—using community power to both manage publicly owned 
resources and increase their marketability until that “higher and better” 
buyer emerged.140 
At the time, access to public land in Philadelphia was managed through 
license agreements from the city’s Redevelopment Authority.141  By 2010, 
Philadelphia gardeners and farmers had seen several decades of garden 
losses when licenses were revoked.  A 2008 “Harvest Report” found that 
the number of gardens declined by half from 1996 to 2008.142  In collecting 
garden histories citywide, authors Nairn and Vitiello heard the same story 
from at least a dozen gardeners: “[A] man came from the city one day, told 
me we couldn’t garden here anymore; and in a week or two a bulldozer 
came and cleared the garden.”143 
Some spaces, like the “decades-old Garden of Eatin’,” were sold to 
developers.144  Other gardeners lost spaces to a twenty-first century 
                                                                                                             
 136. Peleg Kremer & Zoé Hamstead, Transformation of Urban Vacant Lots for the 
Common Good: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 8 CITIES & ENVIRONMENT 1, 2 (2015). 
 137. See, e.g., Stephen Sussna, The Concept of Highest and Best Use Under Takings 
Theory, 21 URB. LAW. 113, 113 (1989) (“Highest and best use can be defined as a use that 
has the following characteristics: (1) it is legally and physically possible; (2) it is 
appropriately supported; (3) it is financially feasible; and (4) it results in the highest land 
value.”). 
 138. Id. 
 139. See WACHTER ET AL., supra note 50, at 34. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Vitiello, supra note 61; see also Michael Nairn, Keeping the Community in 
Community Gardening: Aqui Estamos y no nos Vamos, PROGRESSIVE PLAN. MAG. (Jan. 22, 
2007), http://www.plannersnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/2007_170_winter_p.pdf [https://perma.cc/PQ6M-5TAD]. 
 142. VITIELLO & NAIRN, supra note 62, at 44. 
 143. Id. at 36. 
 144. Id. at 35. 
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incarnation of urban renewal “blight” clearance programs.145  Through the 
Neighborhood Transformation Initiative (NTI), a project of former 
Philadelphia Mayor John Street, the PRA scaled up vacant land 
management and used eminent domain, in combination with demolition, to 
create assemblages created to attract developers—a goal with limited 
success.146   
Gardens became collateral damage in this process, as the city displaced 
gardeners and absorbed land into larger parcels to induce market interest 
and encourage the enclosure of community property.  And yet, many of 
these and other NTI spaces remained vacant and undeveloped for a decade, 
replicating the failures of decades of top down and shortsighted urban 
renewal initiatives.147 
Throughout changes in policy and political administrations, gardeners 
and other community land stewards have struggled to understand even 
basic facts about who owns land and how to get legal access.  By 2010, 
multiple city agencies held title to and bore responsibility for one quarter of 
the city’s 40,000 so-called vacant lots.148  Each agency had, and still has, a 
different process and priorities for making land available for sale or lease, 
and each process can be lengthy and full of pitfalls.149  Even a successful 
acquisition of a city-owned parcel could take up to three and a half years.150  
For the remaining 30,000 privately owned and mostly tax delinquent 
parcels,151 the path to legal access was even more fraught as the owners of 
                                                                                                             
 145. See supra note 29. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 35-36. 
 148. Prior to 2015, these agencies were Redevelopment Authority of the City of 
Philadelphia (RDA), the City of Philadelphia Department of Public Property, Philadelphia 
Housing Development Corporation, and Philadelphia Housing Authority. Black, supra note 
17; see also ECONSULT CORP. ET AL., VACANT LAND MANAGEMENT IN PHILADELPHIA, at i, 9-
10 (2010) (outlining the many and various agencies tasked with maintaining vacant land as 
of 2010).  As of December 9, 2015, the City of Philadelphia began transferring properties 
into a fifth city-controlled entity, the Philadelphia Land Bank, tasked with streamlining 
access to land. Claudia Vargas, Phila. Land Bank Now Open for Business, PHILLY.COM 
(Dec. 11, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-12-11/news/68934205_1_vacant-properties-
city-council-philadelphia-land-bank [https://perma.cc/EZ5A-887A]. 
 149. See, e.g., Ryan Briggs, How to Fix Philly’s Massive Vacant Land Problem, 
PHILLY.COM (June 8, 2015), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/mayor/How_to_fix_Phillys_massive_vacant_lan
d_problem.html [https://perma.cc/YP9V-68B9]; see also Amy Laura Cahn, Supporting Our 
Land Stewards: Building a Constituency to Change Policy and Preserve Philadelphia’s 
Gardens, 8 CITIES & ENVIRONMENT 1,3 (2015). 
 150. Black, supra note 17; see also PHILLY LAND BANK, VACANT PROPERTY DISPOSITION 
PROCESS, http://may8consulting.com/publications/Landbank_Chart.pdf (comparing the steps 
involved in property acquisition prior to the passage of the Philadelphia Land Bank Law 
with the process that creation of the land bank would initiate). 
 151. See Kerkstra, supra note 17. 
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record were often deceased or long-disappeared, with a process of bringing 
properties to tax foreclosure sale that has long been “both highly politicized 
and inefficient.”152  Thus, while gardeners had the tacit support of the City 
to function as a de facto land management team, the lack of access to the 
process dictated that gardeners largely operated under the radar, 
particularly in Philadelphia’s most disenfranchised neighborhoods.153 
Gardeners, farmers, and other land stewards would soon be reminded 
that they did not fully exist to city officials as stakeholders, even as 
decisions were being made to fundamentally change their landscape in the 
city.  In 2010, Philadelphia’s land holding agencies also zeroed in on the 
task of addressing the city’s “vacant land problem.”154  This multi-pronged 
effort included advocating for a state law to enable the creation of local 
“land banks,” improving vacant land management systems, developing 
common land acquisition and disposition policies across city agencies, and 
inventorying all of the city’s land holdings and developing a web-based 
tool to map and more efficiently make City-owned vacant lots available as 
commodities for sale to private actors.155  By December 2011, new vacant 
land disposition policies began to circulate for informal comment. The 
city’s view of stakeholders did not include its existing land stewards: 
policies for community gardens recycled the existing, insecure mechanism 
for land access, the revocable license.  The draft policies even proposed to 
raise barriers to obtaining this tenuous version of land tenure: they 
proposed that an applicant for a license had to be sponsored by a registered 
nonprofit organization and show proof of liability insurance,156 which can 
be both expensive and difficult to acquire.157  In a city where community 
                                                                                                             
 152. Briggs, supra note 149. 
 153. See e.g., VITIELLO & NAIRN, supra note 62, at 35-36; Mahbubur R. Meenar et al., 
Urban Agriculture in Post-Industrial Landscape: A Case for Community-Generated Urban 
Design, ISOCARP CONGRESS 8 (2012), http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/2071.pdf 
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 154. Terry Gillen, The Reform of Vacant Land Policies in Philadelphia, FED. RES. BANK 
OF PHILA. (2010), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-
development/publications/cascade/75/03_reform-of-vacant-land-policies-in-philadelphia 
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PROPERTY, Draft (Dec. 6, 2011), http://planphilly.com/uploads/media_items/http-planphilly-
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[https://perma.cc/C2WG-MSN8]. 
 157. “Maryland urban gardeners have found it impossible to purchase liability insurance 
to cover activities on land to which they have minimal property rights.” Witt, supra note 7, 
at 225. 
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stewards had operated on—and been displaced from—land formally owned 
by public entities for decades, no gardener was consulted and no option for 
long-term land tenure was proposed. 
When asked why gardeners had not been consulted during a full year of 
meetings, a PRA staffer told members of the Mayor’s Food Policy 
Advisory Council (FPAC) Vacant Land Subcommittee: “Urban agriculture 
is not a constituency.”158  
In response, FPAC and the now disbanded grassroots Food Organizing 
Collaborative (FOrC) convened over 100 gardeners and farmers over a 
two-week period to gather feedback about how land policy could better 
reflect their needs.159  They highlighted the place-based nature of garden 
and open space stewardship, the significant and wide-ranging benefits 
garden and farm projects bring to communities, and the intense investment 
of time, money, engagement, and trust-building required to start and 
maintain a garden.  They asked the City to make commitments towards 
continuity and permanence.160 
As a result of this swift advocacy, revised policies were circulated within 
six months.  These policies allowed for up to five-year leases161 for 
community gardens and the promise of leases of variable terms for market 
farms, with signals that there would be a pathway to longer-term 
preservation for more established gardens.162 
However, when  the web-tool, called Philly Landworks,163 launched in 
June 2012, the website reflected gardens’ continued lack of visibility to the 
city and its view that these active spaces were functionally vacant.164  
Active garden parcels were offered for sale online, with no notice to their 
                                                                                                             
 158. At the time, Amy Laura Cahn was a member of the FPAC Vacant Land 
Subcommittee.  She served as the chair of the subcommittee for two years, until becoming 
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FEEDBACK FROM FOOD GROWERS TO PROPOSE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA LAND DISPOSITION 
POLICIES [hereinafter FEEDBACK FROM FOOD GROWERS], http://www.pilcop.org/wp-
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RESEARCH NETWORK, supra note 155. 
 164. Cahn, supra note 149, at 3. 
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existing stewards.  The city’s attempt at making land visible to potential 
consumers ignored the broad scope of vibrant, verdant work on and in the 
ground.165  Opportunity was being made visible by government actors, but 
was only actionable by those aiming to participate in the privatization of 
public assets as opposed to their protection and continued development as 
commons. 
3. “Vacancy” 
This notion of treating gardens as “vacant” land is perhaps the biggest 
culprit in rendering gardens invisible.  An “interim use” policy and an 
associated license agreement have severe limitations and devalue gardens, 
but they at least acknowledge that there is something happening in the 
spaces that residents have transformed and care for.166 
Municipal planning departments in Philadelphia and New York City 
refer to gardens as “vacant” spaces for planning purposes.167  Thus, 
decisions about those spaces are made without acknowledgment of the 
value of these community-stewarded spaces, unless the gardeners 
intervene.  Treating land as vacant until it is “developed” treats the gardens 
as if they are nothing at all; it perpetuates the myth that these active spaces 
are unchanged from the abandoned state that residents found them in before 
bringing them to life as gardens and community-managed parks. 
New York City’s data shows that there are over 500 “vacant” lots in the 
City —almost 9000 acres, about one fourth of them owned by public 
entities.168  While all of these lots are void of buildings, a visitor or 
neighbor would never call many “vacant.”  Truly vacant lots and thriving 
community gardens, parks, and farms all get this same label from the NYC 
Department of City Planning.169  Most also have development rights under 
the NYC Zoning Resolution—meaning the airspace above them is a place 
buildings are permitted to appear within prescribed height limits, 
perpetuating the view that these are simply future construction sites. 170  
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The New York City Law Department relies on the garden use code of 
“vacant” to argue that garden lots are “general land available for a variety 
of municipal purposes, including [private] development.”171 
While City Planning has a use code for “Open Space & Outdoor 
Recreation,” it is not applied to gardens and other community-managed 
spaces; only formal parks where all development rights have been 
extinguished and the areas have been zoned “Parkland” receive this code.172  
The over 500 “permanently preserved” community gardens in the inventory 
of the New York City Parks Department and under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Parks and Recreation are nonetheless use-coded as 
‘VACANT.’ 
4. New York, 1999-2015: Deciding at a Distance 
In 1999, Imani’s local efforts were interrupted by a new interest in land 
for construction.173 New York City Hall began courting private developers 
to entice them to build in neighborhoods like Weeksville,174 by offering 
free and cheap land. The garden lots were declared “surplus” and placed on 
a list for auction. The city prioritized developers’ interests over those of the 
residents.  The efforts of residents to develop their own communities were 
anathema to the administration.  When confronted by protectors of the 
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thriving gardens, former New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani famously 
quipped in a radio interview: “This is a free market economy.  Welcome to 
the era after communism.”175 
Foster and Iaione situate the proposed sale of the gardens as “surplus” 
thus, 
City officials persistently characterized the land as “vacant,” stripping the 
land of its social (and economic) value to its users, and argued that in the 
long run the communities where the gardens sit would benefit from the 
new development and the affordable housing that the city planned to build 
on some of the lots.  This characterization stripped the resource of any 
functional value to the community, or to the city for that matter.  Yet, by 
auctioning off the gardens the city was able to capture the “unearned 
increment” from the resource—the increase in surrounding property 
values resulting from the improved neighborhoods—without accounting 
for the inevitable dispossession and displacement that ultimately resulted 
from gentrification of these neighborhoods.176 
The two City-owned lots being used by the Imani gardeners were 
identified as “surplus” real estate and put on a list to be auctioned, along 
with hundreds of other active garden sites.177  There is no indication that 
the gardeners or the Church administration ever knew about the auction or 
the list.  
A white-led preservationist group, the newly formed New York 
Restoration Project (NYRP), leveraged private funds to save these 
spaces.178  Whether it was the giant maple tree that Shirley Chisholm 
supposedly played under or the thriving rows of kale, Imani caught the 
organization’s eye.  They added the City-owned parcels to the list of 
gardens they would rescue by buying them off the list.179  The middle 
property, the one for which the Housing Committee had formed a not-for-
profit to hold title, was overlooked by New York Restoration Project’s 
attorneys and staff.180 
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Citywide, gardeners argued that the spaces were valuable, as residents 
actively collaborated “toward common neighborhood goals and a sense of 
control over their space.”181  The City of New York, like most 
municipalities, preferred to view these places as “vacant” land and 
disregarded the value that had accumulated through use. 
Individuals and community groups endeavored to stop the auction by 
appealing to procedural requirements.182  Attorney General Elliot Spitzer 
brought a claim on the basis of public trust doctrine183 that led to an 
injunction stopping the auction and a settlement that resulted in hundreds of 
gardens being transferred to the New York City Parks Department for 
permanent preservation as gardens,184 some others being offered to the 
Trust for Public Land (which purchased them) for preservation, and the 
bulldozing of dozens of others to ready sites for private housing 
development.185 
But Imani remained in its own inscrutable context, with title held now 
by a patchwork of private actors.  NYRP took over management of the 
three-lot garden and, as part of its beautification efforts, removed the 
rabbits and peacocks kept by the parishioners.186  The Church’s relationship 
to the property was eroded, and, by 2003, no one was paying the property 
taxes on the middle lot.187  The gardeners scattered.  The land was left 
beautiful but un-used.188 
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New gardeners joined Imani between 2004 and 2011.189  Seeking to 
expand food production, which was difficult in the shade of the willow 
tree, they got an “interim use” license190 for a fourth lot from New York 
City’s Housing Preservation and Development (HPD).191  That property 
had also once been privately owned and had come to the City inventory via 
tax lien foreclosure in 1979.192 
Imani was again thriving, with a different set of stewards.  Our Lady of 
Charity kept its distance from the garden.  Church administrators were told 
NYRP was the new “owner.”193 
The un-quiet statuses of the four properties making up the Imani Garden 
in Weeksville were in the spotlight again in 2015.  In January of that year, 
in an effort to transform Mayor Bill de Blasio’s new housing plan into 
housing reality, HPD published a list of 181 “hard to develop” properties 
they would be willing to sell for $1 to housing developers willing to build 
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housing that would be made available by lottery to income-tested 
residents.194 
The list itself was buried in an Addendum to a “Request for 
Qualifications” (RFQ) addressed to the development community.195  It 
referred to sites being made available through the program by their 
borough, block and lot numbers—a string of numbers very familiar to 
planners and people who work in the real estate industry, and gibberish to 
everyone else.  The City did not distinguish between those that were truly 
empty of any permitted used and those that were actively being used as 
community gardens, pocket parks, and urban farms when the list was 
created. 
In order to understand the City portfolio of land, in 2011, 596 Acres, Inc. 
had created a tool that translated data about the municipal land inventory, 
organized by borough, block, and lot numbers, into a public accessible 
online tool that showed each City-owned parcel in context: 
LivingLotsNYC.org.196 
Mapping unused public land in 2011 revealed nearly 600 acres of 
common land that were simply being warehoused—land that served no 
neighborhood purpose and presented an opportunity to organize.  This 
discovery interrupted the narrative of land scarcity that permeated all talk 
of real estate in New York City under Mayor Michael Bloomberg.197  It 
also put information in the hands of those best positioned to use it to create 
regenerative new community spaces in left-behind neighborhoods: the 
people who lived and worked near the vacant spaces corresponding to the 
numbers in the City’s database.198  For each parcel, the tool shows the 
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agency that has jurisdiction over it, contact information for the relevant 
staff member at the agency, as well as information about which City 
Council member and Community Planning District each is in.199  At of the 
end of 2015, it had facilitated neighbors organizing to transform thirty-four 
empty spaces into community places.200 
When HPD published its list of sites for sale, the fact that this tool 
allowed advocates to look up properties using the same borough, block, and 
lot system that the Addendum to the RFQ uses made visible community-
stewarded spaces suddenly at risk.  Staff at 596 Acres201 checked every one 
of the 181 properties on the list HPD published in the RFQ against 
LivingLotsNYC.org, which allowed cross-referencing with existing 
community spaces.  Within two days of the publication of the Addendum, 
stewards of New York City’s community spaces were shocked: 596 Acres 
discovered that, via that list buried in an appendix, HPD had quietly offered 
at least twenty community garden properties, including the remaining 
Imani City-owned lot, to developers for purchase for one dollar (a lot 
cheaper than the price identical lots were offered for by the Giuliani 
administration in 1999 at the “surplus” real estate auction).202 
Armed with a list of gardens to be lost to development inducement, New 
York City advocates, with 596 Acres at the forefront, were able to quickly 
use and expand an existing network to put community gardeners in the best 
position to respond to the threat long before any particular garden was 
actually scheduled for demolition.203  To be able to respond to these 
“vacant” lots being offered to private for-profit builders, it was necessary to 
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connect the information about which lots were included in the published 
list with the information about which lots are actually being used already, 
as gardens and community spaces.  What would have been a hidden 
conversation in administrative offices with developers and financiers 
transformed into a public discussion on the steps of City Hall, in City 
Council chambers,204 in neighborhoods, and in the press.  Stewards of 
community spaces demanded time and space in the public discussion about 
how to distribute the land that different New Yorkers viewed differently in 
relation to value and whether those spaces were most valuable to local 
communities preserved as gardens or transformed into private residences.205  
Not all gardeners agreed on outcomes, but all agreed that gardeners and 
residents of local communities had a right to the commons, a right to be 
part of the decision-making for the distribution of public assets.206 
On December 30, 2015, the Mayoral administration announced that 
fifteen of the gardens offered for development were instead being 
transferred to the New York City Parks Department for permanent 
preservation as gardens.207  One of the Imani lots—the City-owned one—is 
among those so preserved.  In addition to those fifteen community-
managed sites, the administration secured the land tenure of twenty-one 
other precarious community spaces by transferring them as well: a total of 
thirty-six newly-preserved community spaces emerged out of a public 
discussion of what New York City neighborhoods need.208 
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B. If Invisible, the Potential Commons Is Always Out of Reach 
The rat-infested City-owned lot on the corner of Keap Street and South 
Fourth in the Puerto Rican Los Sures (Williamsburg, Brooklyn’s 
Southside) was designated as an “Open Space” via the Urban Renewal 
Area Plan for the neighborhood,209 adopted by New York City Council in 
1992.210  The plan itself has a lineage stretching back nearly half a century.  
Despite planning that engaged neighbors and local organizations and 
despite City expense to acquire and consolidate the land, the lot, designated 
as “Open Space,” simply languished both in the neighborhood and in the 
City bureaucracy for twenty years.211  It sat in the inventory of HPD, which 
also serves as New York City’s local redevelopment authority (this means 
HPD gets urban renewal land once the planning and condemnation are 
complete).212  This is how advocates found it in 2012, following the trail of 
data about municipally owned “vacant” land. 
HPD has neither the mandate nor the budget to make sure that planned 
“Open Spaces” in its inventory become real open spaces.213  As the agency 
name suggests, its mandate is limited to the production and preservation of 
places for people to live. 
And so the corner of Keap and South Fourth just kept gathering weeds 
and trash, a potential inducement for a private developer.214  A few times a 
year, City employees would appear to spread rat poison and collect the 
unwanted furniture that collected in the “Open Space” behind the fence.215 
In addition to making hidden threats to community-stewarded spaces 
visible—as it did with the list of for-sale properties HPD published in 
2015—LivingLotsNYC.org also allows advocates to transform data about 
potential community spaces into actionable information.  In August 2012, 
596 Acres posted a sign on the chain link fence surrounding a lot that is 
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now Keap Fourth Community Garden: THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND.216  
The sign was an act of desperation and defiance: the lot had been planned 
as “Open Space” in a plan developed by an engaged community in the late 
1980s, the plan had been adopted by City Council as the Urban Renewal 
Plan for the area in 1992, yet in 2012, it remained an uncared-for, locked, 
lot that collected garbage and rat bait, and where drug deals took place.  
The disinvestment in the space was at least partially a product of its 
invisibility; now that the shared asset was clearly labeled, neighbors could 
get to work.217 
C. Enclosure Is a Threat to All Commons 
Land insecurity for gardeners manifests in the inability to preserve an 
existing, often vibrant and critical, community space.  Land insecurity also 
means that gardeners and other community land stewards may not have the 
tools to legally access land that is or should be commons.  Both are rooted 
in a narrative of perceived land scarcity, but also in a systemic 
undervaluing of collective interests.  What this comes down to is that 
gardens are often unseen as urban space is transformed from city-as-
commons into city-as-commodity. 
David Harvey describes the process of creating shared value thus: 
There is, in effect, a social practice of commoning.  This practice 
produces or establishes a social relation with a common whose uses are 
either exclusive to a social group or partially or fully open to all and 
sundry.  At the heart of the practice of commoning lies the principle that 
the relation between the social group and that aspect of the environment 
being treated as a common shall be both collective and non-commodified: 
off-limits to the logic of market exchange and market valuations.218 
When applied to land, this is absurdly optimistic.  The market captures 
the value created by people living in proximity and creating art and culture 
and “quality” and translates all of that into “land value.”  Capturing that 
value interrupts the city as the commons.219  As long as land can be bought, 
the enclosure of the common wealth created by people in proximity of that 
land is a certainty.220  Even when the land purchased is a private house, its 
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market value is the sum total of its context; that value (with) draws from 
the collaborative and parallel efforts of people other than the buyer, seller, 
or public entities. 
The market abstracts, captures, and encloses the social capital that 
communities create when property is sold.221  The market value reflects the 
monetary value of the community assets that arise from people living in 
proximity and developing responses to shared needs.222  It may seem like a 
truism of the real estate industry that collective assets near a marketable 
“private” property make that property worth more to prospective buyers.223  
But, that calculation of worth is itself an enclosure: a privatization of 
shared labor that threatens to displace the very individuals whose labor 
resulted in the creation of the asset that drives prices up. 
Is the neighborhood full of children playing in the street?  Neighbors 
work together to get the vacant lot on the corner turned into a playground. 
(And property values go up.)  Is fresh produce expensive to buy locally or 
simply not available?  Neighbors collaborate to bring subsidized 
community supported agriculture to the library once a week. (And property 
values go up.) Is the library closed on Sundays, when most people want to 
use its meeting rooms and browse its shelves?  Neighbors lobby the 
administration for better hours. (And property values go up.)224 
These scenarios are exactly what David Harvey terms, “accumulation by 
dispossession,”225 and what John Davis describes as “immoral:” the private 
capture of community-generated value and its transformation into 
individual “wealth.”226 
Urban land left empty through disinvestment continues to present both 
an opportunity and a threat.  The opportunity is that of creative, and often 
collaborative, transformation—a product of community self-determination 
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with an immediate positive impact on the surrounding area.  Without legal 
protections for land tenure, the risk is that some distal party will capture the 
value created by these efforts when market actors take an interest in an area 
or specific parcel. 
III.  INTERVENTIONS TO HOLD ENCLOSURE AT BAY 
The alternative—living in the midst of abandonment, disinvestment, and 
“distress”—is untenable. But without land security, community land 
stewardship itself is a risk.  Certainly, neighbors standing on the street in 
front of a lot full of garbage, needles, and rat poison, want something better 
for their neighborhood; but they also certainly want some assurance that, 
should they put the effort into creating something better, there is some 
pathway to permanence and securing the land itself and to participation in 
decisions about which lands to abandon to the market and which to keep as 
commons. 
That community land stewards cannot count on land security or a voice 
in decision-making reflects an ongoing lack of administrative awareness of 
complicated and overlapping claims to property.  This is, in part, a failure 
of imagination227—the failure to see that the city itself is a “shared resource 
that belongs to all of its inhabitants.”228  That failure has political and 
ethical dimensions that have, at their roots, an ongoing refusal to 
acknowledge “all” of these inhabitants as both having a claim over and 
needing to share equitably in the city and its resources.229  The true tragedy 
of the city as commons is its invisibility, not its overuse.230  Truly ethical 
urban governance systems must account for the impact of decades of 
neglect, must acknowledge spaces transformed as a result of community 
stewardship, and must make sure that the value generated by community 
action is only allowed to be captured and sold to private actors when the 
community that created that value decides that such a sale is desired. 
Making existing spaces and sites of potential engagement visible and 
actionable, presents an opportunity to reverse racist patterns of land 
allocation and accumulation result current inequities. Since power, 
knowledge, and historical privilege have a tendency to accumulate around 
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communities and individuals with traditional access to power, reversing the 
trend while expanding the commons must be a conscious act and involves 
ensuring that people impacted by histories of violence and trauma most 
benefit from access to information, guidance, support, and solidarity.   It 
comes down to a question asked by Vancouver activists when faced with 
the loss of their urban commons: 
Does a low-income community have a right to occupy the land its 
members have lived on for decades?  Or is the unlimited right of 
landowners and developers to make the best profit on the land that the 
free market can give?231 
Understanding what is already ours and what could be managed as a 
shared resource shapes the structure of dreams, requests, and demands.  
The government of Bologna recognized that residents knowing which 
places “could be the target of action of care and regeneration” are a 
prerequisite to having people engage in that loving process.232  Without 
dreams of shared resources accessible to neighbors and presented in 
relatable ways, requests and demands cannot emerge.  Because most cities 
have not adopted a formal obligation to announce to the public which 
places invite collaboration and care, advocates must make their own 
invitations.  Advocates use whatever information is available—from local 
knowledge to Open Data—to build directories of the possible and invite 
participation from key stakeholders. 
A. Make Existing Community-Stewarded Places Visible and Expose 
Pathways to Access 
Intervention is necessary to facilitate engagement with the city as 
commons and to make security in that engagement possible for individuals 
and communities that have invested in places despite a history of 
abandonment and a narrative of scarcity. 
1. Philadelphia, 2016 
Central Club’s status as an extra-legal land steward never hindered its 
vibrancy as a cohesive force in the neighborhood.233  But, intervention was 
required to formalize Central Club’s legal connection to the land and align 
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it with the lived experience of people on Alter Street.234  Facing post-tax 
foreclosure sales of multiple parcels, Central Club, with legal counsel from 
the Garden Justice Legal Initiative (GJLI), appeared before the 
Philadelphia Court of Commons Pleas to tell Mrs. Wilson’s story and 
request a postponement of the sales.235  The court obliged, allowing Central 
Club to take the time granted to seek a nonprofit real estate tax exemption 
going back to 1978.236  Central Club succeeded by showing the 
Philadelphia Board of Revision of Taxes (BRT) eight decades of photos 
demonstrating the Club’s role as land stewards.237  In 2012, the court and 
the BRT worked with Central Club to rewrite history, retroactively 
declaring the organization to have long been the bona fide nonprofit owner 
of the property and providing a pathway for the organization to participate 
in the determination of the future of the value it had created.238 
Like Central Club, the majority of Philadelphia’s hundreds of 
community-managed gardens and open spaces operate without legal 
permission.239  Unlike Central Club, those able to establish legal rights to 
land using the traditional law governing private property are few.  
However, other claims and other strategies hold promise for putting 
community in control of land disposition, including asserting rights under 
the public trust doctrine240 (as was done in New York City)241 and 
preserving public access to public land or preserving land through 
establishing not-for-profit community land trusts to hold title to community 
assets.242 
                                                                                                             
 234. Valerie Russ, Grays Ferry Community Garden Wins a Reprieve, PHILA. DAILY 
NEWS (May 16, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-05-16/news/31727728_1_tax-exempt-
status-vacant-lots-grays-ferry. 
 235. Defendant’s Petition to Stay Execution, supra note 13. 
 236. See Lauren Hertzler, Year in Review 2012: Rescue, S. PHILLY REV. (Dec. 27, 2012), 
http://test.callowayproject.com/2012/dec/27/Year-in-Review-2012-Rescue-184860471/ 
[https://perma.cc/K9PL-8552]. 
 237. Myers, supra note 12. 
 238. See Esposito, supra note 81.  
 239. Id. 
 240. One, as yet, untested legal route might be to ask the court to require the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its municipal governments to live up to their state 
constitutional mandate to protect the public trust on behalf of “all the people,” equitably and 
for the benefit of future generations. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 
985 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (stating that Pennsylvania has a state constitutional duty 
to serve as trustee of the state’s “public natural resources”). 
 241. See City Respondents’ Memorandum of Law, Coney Island Boardwalk Cmty. 
Garden v. City Of New York, No. 6033 (Kings Co. Sup. Ct. 2014) [https://perma.cc/S9JY-
N9X7]. 
 242. The Neighborhood Gardens Trust, Philadelphia’s community garden land trust, is 
one of many around the country that preserve community garden and open spaces in 
perpetuity, taking the land out of the market permanently. See About the Neighborhood 
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To make pathways to securing the land visible, in the face of potential 
enclosure, activists first needed to know the places in need of 
preservation.243 
In Philadelphia, during the summer of 2012, GJLI began a garden data 
collection process.244  Building on existing data from the Vitiello and Nairn 
2008 study,245 GJLI used its relationships, crowd sourcing, and 
neighborhood-based ground-truthing to begin mapping the physical scope 
of Philadelphia’s existing stewarded spaces, and to meet its land stewards 
in person and understand their histories and current needs.246  Pairing on-
the-ground and web-based strategies, GJLI soon had a database of facts 
about places.247  Now, GJLI staff could alert gardeners to spaces at risk and 
connect them with pathways to legal access.  Additionally, GJLI had the 
context to work with gardeners as advocates in removing decades-old 
barriers to land tenure.248 
The Pulaski Zeralda Garden in Northwest Philadelphia and the Early 
Bird Farm in South Philadelphia are two places that were put on the 
preservation pathway through visibility.  The Pulaski Zeralda has been “the 
only spot of green” on a block of row houses for twenty-five years.249  
Early Bird Farm is a newer market farm in one of Philadelphia’s most 
rapidly gentrifying neighborhoods.250 GJLI cross-referenced City-owned 
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properties listed for sale on the city’s Philly Landworks website251 with 
existing garden data.252  Pulaski Zeralda and Early Bird Farm were up for 
sale to any bidder, along with sixty-eight other gardens and farms.253   
Armed with that information, GJLI visited each one of these seventy at-risk 
spaces,254 speaking directly with as many gardeners as could be found, and 
leaving at every site laminated detailed instruction about the garden’s status 
and the most effective places to begin the pathway to preservation, 
including submitting an expression of interest to the land-holding agency 
and asking for assistance from the district councilperson.255  Pulaski 
Zeralda immediately began a process of preservation by the local 
community garden land trust, while the Early Bird farmers purchased their 
farm lot directly from the City,256 so that the farmers now hold the deed 
themselves.257 
The following year, GJLI again used data to make at-risk gardens 
visible, once again in the context of a rezoning proposal that would, if 
adopted, have restricted gardening to only some parts of the city.  Within 
months of the new zoning code going into effect,258 a district council 
member introduced legislation intended to roll back efforts to legalize 
urban agriculture259 through an outright ban on community gardening, and 
market farming in commercial mixed-use areas.260  This legislation, in 
banning gardening and farming on about one-third of commercial land, 
would have put about 20% of Philadelphia’s gardens and farms at risk of 
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being in areas where gardening would be forbidden.261  Having key 
information about the impact of the bill made urban agriculture visible in 
the media and in city council chambers.262  Within a month, the ad-hoc 
Coalition for Healthier Foods and Greener Spaces, with threatened gardens 
and farms at the fore, convinced city council members to remove from the 
bill any provisions negatively affecting urban agriculture.263  And out of 
that ad-hoc organizing effort, a more formal garden and farm coalition was 
born, now called Soil Generation.264 
In the spring of 2015, GJLI used garden data, again, this time to mitigate 
the impact of the City of Philadelphia’s tax lien securitization.265  The 
revival of the largely failed 1997 policy, the City announced intent to use 
property tax debt, once again, as collateral to raise short term funds by 
selling 1400 tax liens to private investors.266  GJLI knew from experience 
with Central Club that privatized debt creates an additional barrier to 
transferring abandoned land into new ownership, including for garden 
preservation.  GJLI pushed back with other advocates, reminding city 
officials that “properties whose liens were sold [in 1997] remained in limbo 
for years and unavailable for redevelopment because tax balances 
continued to be uncollectible.”267 
Advocates cross-referenced garden data with the tax lien pilot list: a list 
of properties to be included in a pilot sale of tax debt.  Five active gardens 
were on the list, including one GJLI client, and a non-profit garden and 
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nature center that had just applied for and received a nonprofit real estate 
tax exemption.268 
Informed of these inclusions and warned about the disruptions to 
communities that would ensue should the debt sales go forward, 
Philadelphia officials removed these properties from the list.269  Publicizing 
the list and pending lien sale also put gardeners on notice.270  They too 
came forward to prevent tax lien sale of their spaces.271 
Building visibility for existing gardens has meant that others besides 
advocates are paying attention.  In 2016, a staff member from the city’s 
private tax collection firm flagged a garden when cross-referencing parcels 
headed for foreclosure action.272  It is part of a large network of gardens 
serving Philadelphia’s Bhutanese and Burmese refugee population.273  This 
is a garden that may now not be sold. In the struggle to preserve the city as 
commons, gardeners are visioning a changing city and making that vision 
seen and heard, most recently representing a “richly diverse” Philadelphia 
at City Council hearings on urban agriculture.274  And, in the midst of it all, 
Central Club prepares its 70th Harvest Fair.275 
2. New York, 2016 
Announcing public land as an opportunity for neighborhood engagement 
in New York City allows people to not only engage with the land itself and 
each other, but also with the political process.  The space that became Keap 
Fourth Community Garden sat waiting until neighbors, working together 
and in response to the specific information about the sign 596 Acres posted 
on its fence, were able to manifest the “planned” open space by creating a 
community garden.  In June 2014, two years after the sign posted by 596 
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Acres went up on the lot, the ribbon was finally cut on the Keap Fourth 
Community Garden.  Shortly before, the lot had finally been transferred to 
the Parks Department.276  Neighborhood parents, a Latino-youth-led 
“Green Light” district campaign, and the daycare center next door came 
together to gather the support needed to force the city agencies to do what 
was planned.  They collected hundreds of petition signatures, dozens of 
letters of support from businesses and nonprofits, and came up with a 
layout for the space and a plan to build it using a combination of City and 
philanthropic resources; all of that, just so twenty-two years after a City-
sanctioned plan for a new Open Space in the neighborhood it could become 
a reality.277 
The key to identifying the lots that became the Keap Fourth garden as a 
place simply waiting to become the target of care and regeneration was 
unearthing and reviewing the over 150 comprehensive neighborhood 
master plans adopted by the City of New York under the Urban Renewal 
umbrella.278  These plans have existed in paper form in HPD offices, but 
have been historically inaccessible to the public.279  Over 100 hours, a team 
of trained volunteer records inspectors examined each plan and listed all 
the lots that were included in it, again using numbering system that the City 
uses.280  Where possible, they included the dispositions that were promised 
where those were available—which lots were envisioned as (or promised to 
be) “open space,” which were planned to be “commercial,” and which were 
planned to be “residential.”281 Thus, unfulfilled promises became visible as 
once and future commons and exposed clear opportunities for today’s 
residents to pick up where their predecessors had been left behind by the 
                                                                                                             
 276. See BWW News Desk, NYC Parks Cuts Ribbon on Keap Fourth Garden in 
Brooklyn, BROADWAYWORLD.COM: BROOK. (June 4, 2016), 
http://www.broadwayworld.com/brooklyn/article/NYC-Parks-Cuts-Ribbon-on-Keap-
Fourth-Garden-in-Brooklyn-20140604 [https://perma.cc/8XDM-3XS2]. 
 277. Another space, Hooper Park, also planned as “Open Space” for South Williamsburg 
in the plan adopted in 1992, sits waiting to this day.  Neighbors saw signs in 2012 and 
started galvanizing support to manifest the planned park amenity.  In 2016, after “careful 
review,” New York City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development approved 
the transfer of the land away from their jurisdiction where it had been languishing for 
twenty-four years; New York City Parks has yet to accept jurisdiction, and Hooper Park 
continues to wait in the wings, as it has since residents conceived it in the late 1980s and 
extracted the City’s commitment via its inclusion in the Southside Urban Renewal Plan. 
 278. Reviewing Past Urban Plans > Discovering Present Impact > Supporting Future 
Actions, URBAN REVIEWER, http://www.urbanreviewer.org/#map=12/40.6904/-
73.9627&page=about.html [https://perma.cc/5X9D-GU7E]. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
240 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
City employees charged with stewarding “Urban Renewal” planning and 
execution.282 
Unlike in cities where purchase of most public land is available to all-
comers, the disposition of public land in New York is usually done through 
a process insulated from New Yorkers outside of the politics and 
development communities.283  Opening the conversation about how public 
land is distributed and development encouraged is a distinctly democratic 
project; it is an invitation to residents to witness and take part in a typically 
closed-door process. 
-- 
Despite the NYRP rescue from Giuliani’s surplus auction and the 
grassroots success of getting the remaining City lot transferred to the New 
York City Parks Department for permanent preservation as a garden, Imani 
remains un-secured.  Another invisible transaction threatens to tear the 
garden apart: the sale of the approximately $3200 in tax arrears accrued in 
2003 because neither the Imani Not for Profit, nor NYRP filed for tax 
abatement or paid the taxes in the year after NYRP took over garden 
management.284  The debt was purchased as part of a securitized lien sale 
and, in 2004, the buyer initiated foreclosure.285  By 2015, when the 
foreclosure was decided via a default judgment, the original debt, plus 
interest and fees, had grown to $165,000.286  A referee sold the 20’ x 100’ 
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property in the middle of the garden for $365,000287 to a buyer who listed it 
for sale for $690,000.288  The buyer has initiated an eviction proceeding.289 
 
CONCLUSION 
Visibility can be a tool to advance the city as commons and engage in a 
dialogue about what and who we value in our cities.  This dialogue relies 
on a willingness to ask questions that bring to light historic inequities.  To 
whom are resources, information, places, or even people visible?  Which 
people find themselves at the centers of power and, thus, benefit from 
access to information?  To whose goals is information tailored? 
Existing and potential land stewards so often lack power to decide what 
is to be fenced, who gets keys, and what is best left open, and are at a 
further distance from decision making about how to distribute 
boundaries.290  Interventions and innovations aimed at raising visibility of 
land stewards and stewarded spaces—whether they involve legal or data 
tools or policy change—must be oriented towards shifting power into the 
hands of people most impacted by them, especially those who have been 
disconnected from power over land for generations. 
A. Root the Work in the History of the Place 
Neither land nor people are fungible.  Communities of people have 
connections to places built over generations.  Disinvestment, ongoing land 
insecurity, and ensuing displacement create trauma that only builds on 
patterns of race-based urban policy and practices that have inflicted trauma 
on marginalized communities in cities throughout the twentieth century.291  
It is in this context that it is crucial to ask the question “Who is the City 
for?”  In the words of Bronx-based Black farmer Karen Washington: 
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[T]he movement wasn’t about urban agriculture, it was about survival, 
taking back our communities . . . [n]ow you have people coming into 
gardens that have established histories, that were built on the backs of 
people who made it safe for you to come in, and you’re gonna talk about 
urban agriculture?  You cannot leave out . . . the history and the legacy of 
the elders who were there long before so you can do whatever you wanna 
do.292 
A renewed national dialogue about racism, particularly anti-Black 
racism and systemic violence enacted against Black people and 
communities, should make ignoring these considerations anachronistic.293  
It has not. 
As attention is paid to resolving the short-term legal access and long-
term tenure issues of the urban farmers, entrepreneurs in open space, and 
community gardeners, the key is establishing the rights of and opportunities 
for the people who both lived through the period of institutional 
disinvestment in their neighborhoods and responded by investing their own 
social and financial capital into community spaces.  Community land 
stewards need mechanisms to facilitate the preservation and long-term 
sustainability of places.  Invitations to new residents bringing new ideas are 
also needed, but not at the expense of the tenure of those whose labor has 
made the neighborhoods viable for decades. 
Institutionalization of spaces carries with it its own risks.  Creating 
nonprofits that hold title to community spaces or adopting policies and 
pathways to increase legal access to land will not be enough to protect the 
city as a commons if these institutions, policies, and pathways are not led 
or informed by or benefiting the communities most affected or best 
positioned.  Rights-based approaches through which policy and practice are 
informed by an acknowledged history of racial inequity can serve as 
counter-weight to innovation that threatens to “protect” space while 
simultaneously erasing its history.294 
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B. Counter Narratives About Urban Spaces 
In an enthusiasm to spur investment, cities often fail to acknowledge 
history and, with that history, the policies that spurred disinvestment and 
abandonment in the first place.  Twentieth-century history is clear: these 
policies disproportionately impacted African-American, immigrant, and 
refugee communities for years.  Just as using the terms “vacant” or even 
“interim” make the ongoing work of existing land stewardship invisible, 
the use of the term “urban blight,” often as synonymous with vacant or 
abandoned land, reveals how disconnected the dialogue is from historic 
inequity.295 
Decontextualized from its racialized origins, calling a neighborhood 
“blighted” erases the public policies and private actions that predicated the 
neighborhood’s current conditions, and shifts blame to current residents.  
Calling a neighborhood blighted makes invisible the actions taken by 
communities to address terrible conditions.  This term, too, perpetuates the 
invisibility of land stewarded spaces. 
In centering the conversation on existing relationships to place, we 
question common and unhelpful narratives associated with abandoned land.  
In this Article, the stories of Alter Street and Imani demonstrate how 
thoroughly it discounts and discredits urban land stewards to call them 
“interim” or the land they care for “vacant” or “blighted.”  If we see these 
deep roots, can we not see how traumatic it is to pull them?  
Different language is the first step on a road to systemic change.  
Municipalities, residents, and advocates need to learn to “see” the spaces 
that matter to communities.  When looking at a “vacant” lot, residents need 
to understand what its ties are to current administrators, past plans, and 
uses, and how they have a voice in what happens next. 
And when initiating a process that will impact a community-stewarded 
space in a neighborhood, city administrators need to understand the value 
and use of that space locally and see it for more than just a place where no 
building has (yet) been built. 
C. Be Explicit About Race and Equity, Leverage Privilege, and 
Support People of Color in Leadership 
Even as cities encourage a new generation of often young and white 
urban farmers to put vacant land into productive reuse, policies and 
programs fail to recognize the communities of color who stewarded 
abandoned spaces for generations, growing food and creating community. 
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Strategies and policies in service of the city as commons must come 
from and be guided by grassroots efforts.  They must be informed directly 
by what is happening on the ground, as well as by what came before.  
Otherwise “New Urbanism,”296 urban agriculture, and all the hopeful 
efforts to facilitate resident-led creation of neighborhood amenities and 
activation of “vacant” spaces will simply be further systems of exclusion 
and enclosure that perpetuate race-based injustice beneath a veneer of 
localism.297 
In simple terms, we need to continue to emphasize that the question of 
“commons for whom” is explicitly a question of racial equity in this 
country.  And we need to support the increasingly robust Black-led support 
of land and food justice. These are the voices that must set the terms.298 
D. Ensure Voices of Land Stewards Are at the Center 
Law, policy, and data are languages and tools to facilitate visibility, 
access, and preservation.  They do not ensure that gains are equitably felt.  
Nor are the tools themselves or the information provided through them 
accessible to all.  A sign on the fence, a laminated notice, a community 
meeting, and a phone tree are each as critical as law, policy, and data.  And 
more important than each of those are the relationships that we build. 
Strategies for making information about key places visible are vital to 
decentralizing the power to govern among individuals, organizations, and 
formal organs of government.   Decentralized power means including a 
broader swath of people in decisions about the distribution of life-
enhancing elements in cities, which are really decisions about life quality 
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and longevity.299  But that decentralization alone, while a key feature of 
collaborative commons-oriented governance, does not mean that justice 
goals are attained or that centuries of racism, displacement from land, and 
disenfranchisement from decisions about key resources, have been undone. 
Imbuing the city’s decisions with the language of the “commons” forces 
a city to consider “rights, entitlement and justice.”300  In relation to land—
whether vacant or otherwise—under this framework every city is forced to 
weigh one party’s rights (i.e. a private developer) against the rights of 
existing residents already using space (i.e. community gardeners and their 
neighbors).301 
Tools for shifting power to existing communities should be informed by 
the history of decisions about places in the city made at a distance.  What 
would our models for preservation look like, if they were designed to keep 
power in community hands, while guarding against vulnerabilities?  They 
would place control in hands of people of color, encourage broad 
community participation, be based on cultural traditions that inform 
growing practices, and encourage mutual aid and self-determination. 
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